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 Abstract	
Environmental Justice (EJ) scholarship is increasingly framing justice in terms of capabilities. 
This paper argues that capabilities is fundamentally about well-being, and as such there is a need 
to more explicitly theorize well-being. We explore how capabilities have come to be influential in 
EJ and how well-being has been approached so far in EJ specifically and human geography more 
broadly. We then introduce a body of literature from social psychology which has grappled 
theoretically with questions about well-being, using the insights we gain from it to reflect on 
some possible trajectories and challenges for EJ as it engages with well-being. 
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I.	Introduction	
The roots of Environmental Justice (EJ) scholarship are inherently geographical, and can be 
traced to activists and scholar-advocates in the USA concerned about the co-location of noxious 
environmental facilities such as landfills, hazardous waste facilities and ‘dirty’ industry with 
poor, black communities (Bullard, 1990; Cutter, 1995; Di Chiro, 1996). It has, as Walker (2009b) 
aptly observed, always worn its normative heart on its sleeve, and so as the literature matured, it 
is unsurprising that it attracted criticism from both within and without for adopting liberal, 
distributive notions of justice rather too easily (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003) and for being 
insufficiently self-reflexive in its approach to justice and injustice (Schlosberg, 2004; Walker and 
Bulkeley, 2006; Walker, 2009b). But if this were true of the early literature—the purpose of 
which was to highlight some manifestly unjust specific situations mostly affecting communities 
of colour in the USA—it certainly is not of more recent interventions. EJ is identified by Barnett 
(2011: 247) as one of “the two areas of debate in geography where the concept of ‘justice’ is most 
seriously at stake” (the other being work on ‘right to the city’) 
The first steps to a more robust theorization of justice within EJ were taken by David Schlosberg, 
who argued based on his analysis of EJ movement demands that justice must be understood as 
multivalent (Schlosberg, 2004). Subsequently, a number of scholars have been pushing the 
boundaries of theorizing what justice means, drawing on recent shifts in political philosophy 
which have emphasized the non-distributive dimensions of justice (Young, 1990; Sen and 
Nussbaum, 1993; Fraser, 1997; Fraser, 2000; Honneth, 2004; Sen, 2009). In particular, a small 
but critical group of scholars have begun to advocate the ‘capabilities approach’ to justice as a 
conceptual scaffolding within which to theorize EJ (Holland, 2008; Walker, 2009b; Walker, 
2012; Whitehead, 2009; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010; Schlosberg, 2012; Forsyth, 2014; 
Schlosberg, 2007). Developed predominantly by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the 
capabilities approach seeks to provide an alternative way to understand justice to the Rawlsian 
paradigm of ‘justice as fairness’ which has dominated Anglophone political philosophy since the 
publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971 (Sen and Nussbaum, 1993; Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 
2009; Rawls, 1999). The central argument is that justice is not about achieving an appropriate 
distribution of things between people (Rawls’ ‘primary goods’), but rather about people being 
able to live lives that they consider worthwhile (Sen and Nussbaum, 1993).  
There is much to like about the capabilities approach, particularly from an EJ perspective, 
notwithstanding the critiques it has attracted in the philosophical literature (e.g. Jaggar, 2006; 
Arneson, 2013). But one of its central characteristics is that it explicitly defines justice in terms of 
the related concept of ‘well-being’. Well-being is not frequently subjected to sustained conceptual 
scrutiny either by EJ scholars or human geographers more broadly. Nor has it, so far, attracted 
much attention from the broader EJ movement, which has focussed its attention on highlighting 
and campaigning against the distributive, participatory and (increasingly) cultural manifestations 
of injustice (Sze and London, 2008). Of course, these are natural and very valid fronts to focus 
on, and in the course of 30 years significant progress has been made on them. But even 
notwithstanding the increasing tendency to frame justice in terms of capabilities, well-being is 
clearly an important undercurrent driving EJ praxis. It is the well-being of disadvantaged people 
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and communities relative to their advantaged peers which forms the grist in the struggle for 
environmental justice that the movement organizes around.  
So we think the literature has reached a point where it is time to bring well-being more squarely 
into focus and subject it to some critical scrutiny. We think this is of particular importance in 
working through the implications of the recent shift towards framing the ‘justice’ of EJ in terms 
of capabilities theory. While this paper is focussed predominantly on debates within EJ, it should 
also be of broader interests to geographers whose work interfaces with questions of well-being, 
including those working on justice, health, affect and emotion (for a recent themed issue on this, 
see Schwanen and Atkinson, 2015). In the rest of the paper, then, we argue that capabilities is 
fundamentally about well-being (Section II); explore how capabilities have come to be influential 
in EJ (Section III) and how well-being has been approached so far in EJ specifically and human 
geography more broadly (Section IV); introduce a body of literature from social psychology 
which has grappled theoretically with questions about well-being (Section V); and, finally, 
consider some potential future trajectories and research needs.  
II	Capabilities	and	well-being	
In the early 1990s Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum began questioning whether any 
transcendental theory in the social contract tradition was either theoretically adequate or (more 
importantly) politically relevant (see Sen and Nussbaum, 1993). Of course, the towering theory in 
this tradition was—and remains—Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, on which both focussed their 
critical attention. Rawls had set out his theory of justice as an alternative to classical 
utilitarianism, and deliberately constructed it in transcendental terms, seeking to understand “the 
principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act 
justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions” (Rawls, 1999: 8). Sen argued that theories 
such as Rawls’ may be “marvellously radical”, but nevertheless “would not be much invoked in 
the actual debates on justice in which we are engaged” (Sen, 2009: 100). Nussbaum “singled out 
Rawls’s theory for critical examination because it is the strongest political theory in the social 
contract tradition that we have” (Nussbaum, 2006: ix), and argued that Rawls and the social 
contract tradition had failed to provide illumination on debates including women’s equality, 
transnational justice, and inter-species justice (Nussbaum, 2006). The capabilities-based 
approaches of both Sen and Nussbaum (collectively: ‘capabilities theory’) emerged as a critique 
of the social contract tradition in western political philosophy, an alternative approach to justice 
which both argued was of more utility in explaining the world we live in and providing guidance 
for how to live better in it. Capabilities theory is a direct challenge to the entire social contract 
tradition of philosophy, because rather than viewing justice as absolute it instead argues that 
justice is comparative – it depends on what people value. In practice, this means that capabilities 
theory sees well-being, rather than the distribution of goods, as the ultimate measure of justice. 
Sen himself explained it as “a particular approach to well-being and advantage in terms of a 
person’s ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being” (Sen, 1993: 30). Justice is 
considered to be achieved when people are able to live lives that they consider to have value. 
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Subsequently, Sen and Nussbaum have diverged in how they assess this value: Nussbaum 
towards an Aristotelian objective-list account which suggests a finite number of relevant human 
functionings that must be considered (though she has subsequently retreated from this position - 
see Arneson, 2013), and Sen towards a less prescriptive account of capabilities in which 
“individual advantage is judged … by a person’s capability to do things he or she has reason to 
value” (Sen, 2009: 231). Sen tends to see ‘freedom’ rather than ‘well-being’ as the central 
criterion for justice within the capabilities approach, as it accommodates the notion that people 
validly value things other than their own well-being alone. However, as Arneson (2013: 195) 
argues in his critique of Sen’s The Idea of Justice,  
Much the same is true of freedom and capability. They are of supreme importance, but 
they do not provide reasons for action and policy that stand independent of well-being 
concerns. Capabilities are crucial means to wellbeing and some aspects of freedom 
and capability are partly constitutive of important components of well-being. That 
gives capability its due. 
In other words, a good case can be made for well-being as the ultimate value in the capabilities 
approach, and the implication of this is that any use of the capabilities approach must necessarily 
be cognisant of broader debates about well-being. In particular, since capabilities theory focusses 
almost exclusively on individuals as morally-relevant subjects, there seems to be a case for 
examining work proceeding largely from social psychology on the question of personal (or 
psychological) well-being, in order to deepen and broaden the understanding of and engagement 
with the underlying concept of well-being. However, before we introduce this literature, it is 
important to understand how capabilities theory has emerged in EJ, and also how well-being is 
already being treated in EJ. We turn to these questions in the next two sections. 
III.	Environmental	Justice,	justice	pluralism,	and	capabilities	
In the 1980s, activists in the American South began to organise around the growing realisation 
that environmental ‘bads’ such as toxic waste dumps and dirty industry were overwhelmingly co-
located with black communities, particularly poor ones (Bullard, 1990). If the initial concern was 
of ‘environmental racism’, it quickly developed into a broader movement for ‘environmental 
justice’ building on the achievements of the civil rights movement in particular, as well as 
elements of the environmental movement. EJ was first and foremost an activist concern, but 
quickly developed into a broader political and scholarly project (Cutter, 1995; Debbané and Keil, 
2004; Walker, 2009a). As it grew, the justice concerns of actors working under an EJ ‘umbrella’ 
have diversified greatly; from the disproportionate ability of elites to shape the global economy 
through institutions such as the World Trade Organization to the right of indigenous and local 
communities to be recognised as valid interests in land-use discussions in both developed and 
developing countries in addition to context-specific demands over environmental quality 
(Schlosberg, 2004; also Agyeman et al., 2003). Perhaps for this reason, the EJ movement has 
never sought to develop a unifying narrative on justice, and EJ scholarship has largely followed 
suit. Rather than seeing the ‘militant particularism’ of the EJ movement as a weakness (as David 
Harvey does, see Harvey, 1996), EJ scholars have constructed the necessary theoretical supports 
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for understanding justice as multivalent and pluralistic, recognising diversity without attempting 
to homogenise it. 
David Schlosberg’s work has been influential in this regard. He argued that justice should be 
understood as ‘trivalent’, requiring attention to issues of distribution, participation and 
recognition as “three interlinking, overlapping circles of concern” (Schlosberg, 2004: 521; also 
Schlosberg, 2007). If distribution and participation can be mapped onto traditional, liberal justice 
concerns, the notion of recognition is derived from work in left-wing and feminist political 
philosophy which has questioned the primacy of distribution in the justice calculus (Fraser, 1997; 
Honneth, 2004). This trivalent understanding of justice has subsequently been widely adopted in 
the literature, which has been characterised in recent years by a commitment to ‘justice pluralism’ 
(Walker and Bulkeley, 2006; Holifield et al., 2009; Walker, 2012; Martin, 2013). The 
engagement with the ‘capabilities approach’ to justice has emerged as scholars have developed 
this engagement. In Defining Environmental Justice (2007), Schlosberg introduced EJ scholars to 
capabilities theory, arguing that capabilities could be understood as an additional dimension of 
justice and that capabilities theory could also be a more productive theoretical edifice within 
which to theorize EJ than the contractarian, liberal egalitarian ‘justice as fairness’ approach 
associated with Rawls. In this sense, the turn to capabilities was in part a response to claims from 
some critics that EJ had lost its radical edge. Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003), for instance, 
argued in making their case for the merits of Urban Political Ecology over EJ that “the 
environmental justice movement speaks fundamentally to a liberal and, hence, distributional 
perspective on justice, in which justice is seen as Rawlsian fairness and associated with the 
allocation dynamics of environmental externalities”  (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003: 910). This 
argument resonated with critiques even from within the EJ tradition. For instance Gordon Walker 
observed that geographical EJ scholarship “has been largely bereft of sustained reasoning about 
what the justice in environmental justice should constitute and why” (Walker, 2009b: 205), and 
Ryan Holifield showed how the Clinton administration deployed neo-communitarian strategies in 
an (ultimately, in his view, unsuccessful) attempt to make “the idea of environmental justice, 
usually invoked as a challenge to market-driven environmental policy, compatible with processes 
of neoliberalization” (Holifield, 2004: 287).  
For Schlosberg, Walker and a growing list of others, capabilities theory supports the core beliefs 
and radical heart of EJ praxis, while adding nuance and sophistication to the theorization of 
justice, most notably providing theoretical support for the idea and practice of justice pluralism 
(Schlosberg, 2007; Schlosberg, 2012; Schlosberg, 2013; Walker, 2009b; Walker, 2012; 
Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010; Martin, 2013; Holland, 2014). Walker explains why it is a good 
fit for EJ: “it has an internal pluralism, incorporates a diversity of necessary forms of justice, 
rather than privileging only one, and retains flexibility in how functionings and flourishings are to 
be secured” (Walker, 2009b: 205). Indeed, with some minor adjustments—such as the 
admonition that Sen’s rather individualistic application of capabilities should be “extended to 
include collective or community functioning” (Walker, 2009b: 204; following Schlosberg, 
2007)—capabilities is rapidly becoming the core theoretical edifice within which to understand 
and theorize (environmental) justice. But given that well-being is the ultimate value in the 
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capabilities approach, we argue that EJ scholars need to begin to pay much more direct and 
careful attention to their theorization of well-being, as well as their theorization of justice. 
IV.	Locating	well-being	within	EJ	
Well-being, it must be conceded, is not prominent in the EJ literature, although preserving or 
improving the well-being of particular communities is the motive force behind much of the 
organizing conducted under an environmental justice umbrella (Mohai et al., 2009). If we are to 
draw up a rather crude schema to categorise the explicit mentions of well-being in the literature, 
two formulations emerge: as ‘economic well-being’, where it is broadly synonymous with what 
neoclassical economists call ‘utility’, and as an ancillary of health. In neither formulation is well-
being really the object of analysis. Rather, it is an input to or an outcome of particular 
relationships and conditions, something quantifiable and measurable, something rather 
uncontroversial. 
An example of the first formulation can be found in Haughton’s attempt to assess the EJ 
implications of four different models of sustainable urban development. Haughton (1999: 234) 
argues that “Moving toward sustainable development requires economic and social systems that 
encourage environmental stewardship of resources for the long term, acknowledging the 
interdependency of social justice, economic well-being, and environmental stewardship”. Here, 
well-being is something analytically distinct from social justice, though Haughton advocates its 
interdependency with both justice and environmental concern. But most of the time, the absence 
of any specific mention of well-being has the effect of silently legitimizing the preference-based 
accounts so prominent in mainstream economic thinking. Indeed, Sagoff (2008) takes the whole 
discipline of environmental and neoclassical welfare economics to task for assuming that well-
being can be expressed as a function of willingness-to-pay, with the effect that preference-
satisfaction can be used as a proxy for it. Dodds (1997), likewise argues for a more expansive 
understanding of well-being than that generally adopted by environmental economists, and a host 
of more recent interventions have taken issue with it in both philosophical and practical terms 
(e.g. Ferraro and Reid, 2013; Bina and Vaz, 2011; Frey and Stutzer, 2005; Layard, 2005).  
The second formulation binds well-being to health. For example, Albrecht (1995: 68) argues that 
the EJ movement “is leading many minority and lower-income citizens to demand a greater voice 
in decisions that affect their health and well-being”, and Adger (2002: 1719) observes that “It is 
the poor who reside and work in places where unsustainability is bad for your health and well-
being and who have little or no choice in their lifestyles”. Indeed, the conflation of health and 
well-being is even detectable in recent work bringing together EJ and health geographies (Pearce 
et al., 2010). This is not surprising, in one sense. The origins of the moniker can be traced to the 
World Health Organization’s 1948 definition of health as a ‘state of … wellbeing’ rather than the 
‘absence of disease’, which was an attempt to “reconceptualize health and health care practice 
away from a focus on the individual and absence of specific diseases towards seeing health as a 
positive attribute” (Fleuret and Atkinson, 2007: 106). However, as commentators both within 
health geography and social psychology have observed, in practice the ‘health and well-being’ 
moniker has successfully broadened the conceptualization of health but entirely failed to define 
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well-being (Fleuret and Atkinson, 2007; Bourke and Geldens, 2007), despite wide usage in the 
medical humanities and health geography in the last 20 years. Moreover, bundling health and 
well-being together in such a fashion implies a direct relationship between health and well-being 
which is hard to sustain either in philosophical terms or in reality.  
Thus, while well-being has always been an implicit concern of the EJ movement, EJ scholarship 
has not directly sought to theorize it. If the recent shift to capabilities within EJ reflected a 
‘theoretical turn’ which sought to correct a rather uncritical and unproblematic approach to the 
‘justice’ of EJ, a similar shift is needed in how scholars engage with the related notion of well-
being. But this theorization is relatively under-developed at present, even amongst scholars 
working with capabilities theory. Explicit discussion of or reflection on well-being is not 
prominent in Schlosberg’s early work, which has been particularly influential in charting out the 
applicability of the capabilities approach to EJ (Schlosberg, 2007; Schlosberg, 2013), despite the 
fact that Schlosberg and Carruthers (2010: 15) summarise the capabilities approach as being 
centrally concerned with “the justice of arrangements not simply in distributive terms, but more 
particularly in how those distributions affect the ultimate wellbeing and functioning of people’s 
lives”. 
Other commentators have raised well-being more explicitly. Breena Holland recently argued that, 
at least in Nussbaum’s approach, one of the most significant benefits of capabilities is the fact 
that they “provide a more accurate account of individual well-being than a person’s goods and 
resources can illuminate” (Holland, 2014: 69), such that capabilities theory illuminates “the basic 
features of a theory of well-being that defines both what comprises well-being and why, thus 
conceived, it can improve well-being assessment as theorized and practiced in international 
development policy” (Holland, 2014: 69). Capabilities, in this sense, is an approach to defining 
well-being, and justice is to be found in the extent to which people are able to achieve this well-
being. Gordon Walker’s (2009b) brief intervention in Antipode, likewise, puts well-being in a 
central position in talking about the substance of capabilities, showing that for him capabilities 
are fundamentally about well-being. Walker finds “much potential in using the capabilities 
approach to structure normative thinking about environmental concerns … While there are some 
(a few) core aspects of human well-being that surely do transcend place and time, there are others 
that will be specific and necessarily reflective…” (Walker, 2009b: 205, emphasis added). 
Subsequently, writing with Day, Walker argues that “the injustice of fuel poverty can be read as a 
lack of recognition of the needs of certain groups, and, more fundamentally, as a lack of equal 
respect accorded to their wellbeing” (Walker and Day, 2012: 71).  
So scholars are somewhat inevitably being drawn into discussions about well-being as they seek 
to develop a capabilities-based EJ. But much more needs to be done in this regard, because as 
Ballet et al. (2013) acknowledge in an early attempt to defend a capabilities-based conception of 
EJ, “The capabilities approach is an attempt to renew the assessment of wellbeing, in a manner 
that can stand up to utilitarianism and resourcist approaches” (Ballet et al., 2013: 29). As it 
stands, however, well-being remains under-theorized in the EJ context, something which the 
capabilities approach seeks to give form to but which remains out of direct sight. Here there seem 
to be clear gains to be made from engaging with work, mainly from social psychology, which has 
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sought to theorize and understand the psychological dimensions of personal well-being. We 
believe that engagement with this literature provides an entry-point into a theorization of well-
being which would be productive for EJ scholars to explore. We turn to this literature in the next 
section. 
V.	Theorizing	well-being	
There is a significant body of literature, mainly within the social psychology tradition, which 
focusses on what it means to be well or unwell (Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2008; Mathews and 
Izquierdo, 2009), how these understandings of wellness relate to life experiences (Christopher, 
1999), and how well-being can be measured (Linley et al., 2009). Where well-being is used 
without a qualifying prefix (as with the capabilities approach) it is generally some kind of 
personal or psychological well-being which is being discussed, but a wide variety of qualifiers 
are often brought into the discussion. For instance, we can consider well-being at specific times 
(such as childhood well-being) in specific locations (such as neighbourhood well-being) or for 
different groups of people, such as communities, societies and cultures (community well-being, 
social well-being and cultural well-being respectively). Well-being is a difficult concept to pin 
down. In this section, we introduce this literature, examine the dominant theorizations of well-
being within it, and consider how they relate to the capabilities approach and EJ more broadly. 
We confine our discussion here to notions of personal—or what might better be called 
psychological—well-being, reflecting the key role that individual psychology has had in these 
debates. Such notions seem to us most directly relevant to the capabilities approach, but it is 
likely that EJ scholars would want to engage with related notions, particularly those centred on 
community, in addition, building on the work of Schlosberg (2007). 
Much of the psychological well-being literature is—not surprisingly—dominated by social 
psychology, although the philosophical bases of the debates reach back as far as the ancient 
Greeks. Such literature has been divided fairly straightforwardly into two approaches to well-
being. The first conceptualizes well-being in hedonic terms, arguing that well-being is about 
achieving a state of subjective personal happinessi. It has tended to use the term ‘subjective well-
being’ (Diener et al., 1999; Kesebir and Diener, 2008; Pavot and Diener, 1993; Tiberius, 2004), 
and we might draw some parallels between it and debates in EJ which have sought to explore the 
subjectivities and experiences of (in)justice. The second conceptualizes well-being in eudaimonic 
terms, arguing that well-being entails much more than simply feeling subjectively happy; that 
well-being is about achieving a satisfaction with one’s life whether or not one feels subjectively 
happy (Huta and Ryan, 2009; Ryan and Deci, 2001; Ryff and Singer, 2008). Human geographers 
have also engaged with discussions of well-being, with recent articles on the ‘geographies of 
well-being’ (Schwanen and Atkinson, 2015; Atkinson, 2013) illustrating the contributions of 
geography in recognising the concept as subjective and relational (Andrews et al., 2014; Atkinson 
and Joyce, 2011; Kearns, 2014), related to ideas of emotion (Tucker, 2011). Whilst this is a 
growing body of scholarship, the distinction between philosophical traditions of hedonia and 
eudaimonia is not one that EJ scholars or human geographers more broadly have engaged with in 
a sustained way. 
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The literature in the hedonic tradition focusses on understanding and examining how satisfied 
individuals are with particular elements of their lives, such as work, health and relationships. It 
understands well-being in terms of positive emotions and moods, or alternatively the absence of 
negative emotions and moods (Kesebir and Diener, 2008). Scholars working on subjective well-
being have sought to measure well-being through proxies such as the extent to which individuals 
feel happy and satisfied in life, and then developed scales of well-being in an attempt to facilitate 
comparisons of relative psychological well-being between people (Diener et al., 2006). In 
developing such comparative instruments, there are parallels with the way the neoclassical 
economic tradition uses preference satisfaction as a proxy for well-being. But the work on 
psychological well-being adopts a much broader framing of the drivers of well-being, and 
articulates with broader work from philosophy which strongly rebuts the suggestion that 
preference satisfaction is a reliable proxy for even hedonic well-being. As O’Neill argues, 
“Individualsʼ preferences are a reliable guide to hedonic well-being only if at least two 
conditions are met: first, personal hedonic well-being is the object of their preferences; 
second, they are able make reliable judgements about what will make them happy … 
there are often good reasons to question the first condition. However, it is the second 
condition that has been principally questioned in recent hedonic research.” (O’Neill, 
2008: 12) 
Notwithstanding its internal debates, the hedonic approach to well-being has been criticised for 
assuming that there is one single pursuit of happiness (Mathews and Izquierdo, 2009), and that 
happiness should be maximised wherever and whenever possible (Fleuret and Atkinson, 2007). 
Furthermore, measures of hedonia have been criticised for being of limited scope as they only 
measure certain, limited aspects of life satisfaction (Mathews and Izquierdo, 2009). In this 
context, we turn our attention to the major competing approach to theorizing well-being: the 
eudaimonic approach. 
Eudaimonia is a more encompassing concept than hedonia and understands well-being in terms of 
a person’s ability to flourish, where flourishing encompasses elements such as success and 
virtuousness in addition to happiness. In terms of psychological well-being, the key distinction 
between hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives is that the former emphasises the absence of 
negative feelings or life events, whilst the latter does not. For eudaimonic theorists such as Ryan 
and Deci (2001), events that do not provide pleasure or contribute to an individual’s (subjective) 
happiness may nonetheless allow the individual to flourish and thus contribute to their well-being. 
In essence, within the eudaimonic tradition, psychological well-being can exist through the 
achievement of goals that are not necessarily pleasure-giving, with happiness only ever one part 
of what makes individuals feel ‘well’. However, if there is debate in the hedonic tradition over 
what is required to ensure, and how to measure happiness, there is an even greater division 
amongst eudaimonic theorists. This division concerns the exact meaning and translation of 
‘eudaimonia’, and in particular the psychological needs important for personal well-being and 
how it may be measured. The first is ‘psychological well-being’ (PWB), which was developed by 
Carol Ryff and colleagues and argues that there are motives underlying eudaimonic well-being, 
which can be measured across six dimensions; autonomy (a sense of self-determination); 
environmental mastery (capacity to manage one’s life and surrounding world); positive relations 
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with others; purpose in life (belief that one’s life is purposeful and meaningful); personal growth 
(a sense of continued growth and development as a person); and self-acceptance (a positive 
evaluation of oneself and one’s past life). The second is ‘self-determination theory’ (SDT) (Ryan 
and Deci, 2001), which argues that there are three basic needs: having the choice to do what one 
wants (autonomy); being effective and achieving valued outcomes (competence); and, to love and 
be loved (relatedness), and that the degree to which these are achieved impacts on well-being. 
PWB and SDT share an interest in establishing the degree to which an individual’s behaviour is 
self-motivated and self-determined, and both use an objective list of factors to explain such 
phenomena. The critical difference between the two is that whereas SDT identifies the principal 
factors that create well-being, PWB identifies factors to define well-being. 
Of course, the hedonic and eudaimonic approaches to well-being cannot be entirely divorced 
from each other, and though there are significant philosophical differences, scholars have 
increasingly come to understand that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, 
studies have shown that if individuals have positive feelings they are also more likely to report 
higher levels of meaning in life (Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2008). This suggests some 
interdependency between hedonic and eudaimonic ‘forms’ of psychological well-being which is 
yet to be fully understood but may have important repercussions for how well-being is theorized. 
Indeed, O’Neill (2006; 2008) has argued for a rapprochement between the eudaimonic and 
hedonic approaches to well-being in the context of environmental thought, suggesting that 
eudaimonia is catholic enough to provide space for both approaches. Other studies have sought to 
quantify the difference between hedonia and eudaimonia at a variety of scales (including national 
and international studies, and within and across cultures), in an attempt to understand and explain 
the differences between those who report higher or lower levels of personal well-being (Fleuret 
and Atkinson, 2007). Typically, this body of research has examined relationships between well-
being and other factors such as health, achievement, social relationships, religion, aging and 
personality. An example is the work of Ryff et al. (2004), which explored the extent to which 
eudaimonic and hedonic constructs and measures of well-being correlate with indicators of 
physical health. 
One of the key challenges for scholars working on well-being has been the fact that a sense of 
well-being is highly specific to individuals, hard to causally relate to external conditions, and 
variable across the life span of people (Ryff et al., 2004). For instance, conditions such as 
physical health or housing quality may be poor, but a sense of well-being high (Fleuret and 
Atkinson, 2007). Likewise, there is considerable consensus that a person’s sense of well-being 
changes across the life-course, with research suggesting a ‘U’ shaped temporality to peoples’ 
sense of their own well-being, such that well-being reaches a minimum in middle age (mid to late 
40s), regardless of generation (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008). The hedonic tradition has been 
most susceptible to the criticism that it is indifferent to the future, which O’Neill argues is a 
significant weakness, because “The future determines what appraisal we can give to the present” 
(O’Neill, 2006: 165). In short, the complexity and diversity of interpretations of well-being poses 
significant challenges, even within the psychological tradition. In EJ scholarship, terms such as 
well-being, happiness, flourishing, capabilities and functionings all come up, often used 
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interchangeably. But this ‘loose’ usage obscures ontological and epistemological differences – 
including fundamental ones – and suggests that a much more direct and substantive engagement 
with the theoretical debates about the meaning and pursuit of well-being is required, particularly 
if capabilities is to provide the theoretical scaffolding within which the ‘justice of EJ’ is pursued 
and defined. In the next section, we attempt to begin this process by locating EJ relative to the 
hedonic and eudaimonic approaches to well-being and highlighting some potential traps as well 
as some opportunities raised by the increasing shift towards a capabilities approach to justice. 
VI.	Trajectories:	What	kind	of	well-being	for	what	kind	of	EJ?	
A fundamental shift is taking place in how EJ scholars theorize justice, as a growing number 
argue for capabilities theory as a scaffolding within which to theorize justice. In this paper, we 
have argued that capabilities theory fundamentally defines justice in terms of well-being, but that 
the literature on psychological well-being highlights how contested well-being is. There might be 
substantial agreement that well-being is a good thing, but there is considerable and fundamental 
disagreement about what it means to ‘be well’, and whether well-being should be understood in 
hedonic terms as a matter of subjective happiness or in eudaimonic terms as a matter of broader 
satisfaction with life. Given this, there is a pressing need for scholars developing capabilities-
based theorizations of justice (‘capabilities EJ’) to begin to devote at least as much attention to 
well-being as they do to justice. However, we would also contend that the well-being genie is out 
of the bottle for EJ more broadly. 
In this concluding section, then, we seek to stimulate this debate by reflecting on some of the 
possible trajectories and challenges for EJ scholarship as it engages with well-being in a more 
sustained manner. Our focus in doing this is on the emerging ‘capabilities EJ’ since we think this 
represents the direction EJ engagements with justice are moving. This means contrasting 
capabilities EJ with ‘traditional EJ’ scholarship, which largely subscribed to a Rawlsian notion of 
justice. Given the acceptance within EJ of the notion of justice pluralism, suggesting that all pre-
capabilities EJ was Rawlsian is a rather obvious simplification. However, the Rawlsian framing 
of justice was arguably the dominant one (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003; Walker, 2009a), and 
this simplification is analytically helpful to illuminate some key questions and issues which we 
think scholars will be forced to grapple with as they bring well-being more directly into debates 
about EJ. So we ask the reader to bear with us. To start this process, we have developed a simple 
schematic graph that we hope proves a useful tool to stimulate reflection and discussion about 
what kind of well-being EJ seeks and what kind of well-being the outcomes of EJ praxis might 
deliver (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: What kind of well-being for what kind of environmental justice? 
 
Our starting point is that well-being of some form is a desired outcome of any theory of justice, 
and that—notwithstanding the complex relationship between them—eudaimonia and hedonia are 
the dominant theorizations of psychological well-being. So if the chart represents opportunity for 
well-being, for the purposes of analytical simplicity we can divide it into four quadrants. Having 
done this, our first observation is that the bottom left quadrant is a deleterious outcome: if justice 
delivers neither hedonic nor eudaimonic well-being, it is a very meagre form of justice, not much 
to be desired. The basis of this is the same argument against a strict intrinsic egalitarianism, and 
the common analogy is given of the blind person – if equality demands that those with sight are 
deprived of it, then such an egalitarian principle is not likely to attract much support. We might 
similarly exclude from further consideration the top right quadrant, which would be a form of 
justice which maximises opportunity for both hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Though this 
would be a highly desirable state of affairs, given the theoretical tensions between hedonia and 
eudaimonia and our practical knowledge of the scale and extent of existing injustices, it is likely 
to be unachievable.  
This leaves a choice for scholars and activists (ourselves included!) between pursuing a justice 
which maximises the opportunity for hedonic well-being and one which maximises opportunity 
for eudaimonic well-being, visually represented in our diagram as the ‘axis of key debates’. 
Seeking to maximise hedonic well-being is consistent with a notion of justice which gives 
primacy to the individual and their goals, and thus with the individualistic orientation of 
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contemporary liberal society. On the other hand, seeking to maximise eudaimonic well-being is 
consistent with a notion of justice which gives primacy to society and its collective goals. This is 
more contributory or communalist in orientation, and runs against the grain of contemporary 
society; it is more radical and alternative.  
So what sort of well-being should EJ seek? Some scholars have recently argued that hedonic 
conceptions of well-being can be mobilized in support of pro-environmental action such as green 
consumerism (Soper, 2007), at least in part because “Hedonic research offers the possibility of 
decoupling growth in consumption from the improvement in well-being. It raises the prospect of 
decreasing pressures on consumption without a loss in the quality of life and hence of a 
sustainable economy.” (O’Neill, 2006: 159). Indeed, the limited engagements with well-being in 
the ‘traditional EJ’ literature—the idea of economic well-being and the concern for health and 
well-being—both fit broadly within the hedonic tradition. In the former, well-being is seen as 
happiness, which in turn is explained as causally linked to one’s ability to satisfy one’s preference 
through having appropriate economic means for consumption. In the latter, well-being is 
understood as experiencing positive emotions or states of mind by virtue of good health. Of 
course, this post-hoc analysis must be tempered by the understanding that EJ scholarship never 
set out to formulate its justice claims in terms of well-being. Rather, its justice claims were 
grounded in the social contract. So when Bullard (1990) questioned the justice of where noxious 
environmental facilities were located, the injustice lay in their unequal distribution and 
particularly the fact that they were disproportionately located adjacent to poor black communities. 
Undoubtedly, the well-being of these communities was affected by this, but their well-being was 
in many senses secondary to the larger distributive inequality, and particularly the fact that this 
inequality could not be justified according to any accepted approach to justice. Quite the opposite, 
it ran directly counter to Rawls’ ‘maximin’ principle. 
Scholars developing the emerging capabilities EJ, by contrast, have formulated their justice 
claims in terms of ability to ‘function’. As Schlosberg puts it in a recent intervention, “Being able 
to function is what is ethically significant, and injustice is found in the limitation of capabilities 
necessary for that functioning” (Schlosberg, 2012: 452). In framing justice in this way, scholars 
are more clearly framing well-being in eudaimonic terms than even Sen and Nussbaum do in the 
development of capabilities theory. For instance, Sen views happiness (which, confusingly, he 
sometimes calls ‘subjective well-being’) as one capability among many to be considered in 
assessing justice or injustice: “happiness is not the only thing we seek, or have reason to seek” 
(Sen, 2009: 277). So capabilities EJ is already pushing at the limits of capabilities theory’s 
current engagement with well-being (Arneson, 2013). But it is eudaimonic in orientation, whereas 
traditional EJ is rather more ambivalent, but if anything has tended to implicitly understand well-
being in hedonic terms. Yet, drawing on Holifield’s (2004) case of how EJ was institutionalized 
into the US EPA’s program to clean up hazardous waste sites, we might also reflect that though 
the US Government’s strategies to bring EJ within a broader neoliberal paradigm were ultimately 
unsuccessful in totally ‘normalizing’ (or ‘neutralizing’) the EJ community, the attempt to do so 
was substantially aided by the fact the EJ movement never explicitly defined what it meant by 
well-being. 
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Traditional EJ was always in danger of the co-opting influence of mainstream justice discourses, 
but where capabilities EJ has largely overcome this by more consciously (and conscientiously) 
defining justice, it seems that at present it is vulnerable to a similar process of co-option by 
mainstream well-being discourses. In setting out his capabilities approach (which on balance 
seems to have been more influential to EJ scholars than Nussbaum’s), Sen deliberately leaves the 
conditions under which justice is achieved underspecified, and there is space within capabilities 
theory for well-being to be approached in hedonic terms, since the only guidelines it provides for 
justice is that people should be able to do things they have reason to value; to feel that their lives 
are valuable. Though capabilities EJ appears to consciously be adopting a eudaimonic conception 
of well-being, more work is required to clearly and carefully articulate this to circumvent 
attempts to co-opt it by emphasizing hedonic descriptors in assessing capabilities and functioning. 
Despite its flaws, it was arguably the strength of the liberal social contract tradition which 
conferred on EJ a certain moral authority which was accepted by society more broadly, 
particularly as the movement developed in the USA. It gave scholars as scholar-activists a moral 
platform from which to speak out against injustices being experienced by others. But this position 
of moral authority is by no means secure for capabilities EJ, because with notions of well-being 
the ultimate goal of capabilities theory, even if we adopt the broader framing of community 
capabilities advocated by Schlosberg and Walker, it would seem particularly critical to have the 
community (or communities) suffering injustice politically mobilized to provide a moral basis for 
claims of injustice. A failure to mobilize, or indeed a more basic failure of claimants to articulate 
how their well-being is being circumscribed by a lack of capabilities, becomes much more 
theoretically problematic with capabilities EJ, since capabilities theory understands justice in only 
comparative terms, not transcendental ones. Whether or not it is practically problematic is harder 
to ascertain. 
However, in the ‘classic’ local-scale EJ case of a poor black community living adjacent to a 
noxious environmental facility (discussed above), a  Rawlsian framing of justice provides a clear 
account of both what the problem is (inequality, maldistribution of an environmental ‘bad’) and 
how it should be addressed (compensating benefits to the least advantaged). A capabilities 
framing of justice, by contrast, raises a series of questions which must be answered in order to 
establish the basis of the normative claim: What is the condition of the community in question? 
How do they feel that their well-being is impacted by the facility? What is the best functioning of 
the community in question? How is the functioning of the community affected by the facility? 
Likewise at the international scale, if we consider debates about climate justice, a Rawlsian 
framing of justice provides a clear rationale for action to protect those who are both least 
responsible and likely to be most severely affected. We think capabilities provides a much more 
theoretically attractive basis for taking action on climate change, including the kind of ‘justice’ 
actions essential for proper climate change adaptation (Schlosberg, 2012), but it also requires 
mobilizing both a complex academic vocabulary and a diverse affected community. 
So the political mobilization of the ‘affected community’ is thus much more important to 
establish the normative validity of a capabilities-based claim of injustice than a social contract-
based claim, where scholar-activists could speak on behalf of communities from the perspective 
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of recognized normative positions. This renewed need to go back to the community as the 
claimants for justice could, on balance, be a positive thing for EJ scholars. However, it is 
accompanied by an increasing specificity in the ‘justice’ of EJ which could limit the political 
purchase of EJ arguments, particularly at scales greater than the local where consensus is much 
harder to achieve. Though it is outwith the remit of this paper, this suggests that some more 
refined thinking is required on the scalar implications of the way both justice and well-being are 
framed within EJ scholarship.  
Geographers, of course, are well placed to contribute to a better understanding of how scale 
affects notions of well-being such as those introduced in this paper, which at present focus almost 
exclusively on the individual, personal scale. For instance, scholars could think through the 
implications of different scalar perspectives on the way well-being is framed, and develop ways 
to reduce the primacy of the individual in capabilities theory. In doing so, we hope they might 
also to develop new indicators of in/justice—ways of determining how just or unjust a policy, 
programme or existing socio-natural arrangement is—which build on the insights of both justice 
pluralism and capabilities theory. This will inevitably involve a process of mutual dialogue with 
normative and philosophical theory like that called for by Olson and Sayer (2009: 193), who 
argue that geography’s command of the empirics of uneven development can “contribute to 
philosophical considerations of equality and wellbeing, just as a more thorough engagement with 
moral philosophy and with normative reasoning can improve the quality of our geographical 
work by sharpening our language and categories and exposing our assumptions to mutual 
critique”.  
EJ epitomises the tension at the heart of any radical normative project: its radical aspirations 
constantly come up against the constraints of what is politically possible to mainstream society. 
Indeed, this tension was in many senses the prompt which catalysed the recent shift to capabilities 
theory, which is more plural and more comparative, than Rawlsian justice ever was. But scholars 
must support the incipient capabilities EJ with a conscious and nuanced theorization of well-
being, since if justice is achieved when people are able to live lives they consider worthwhile, 
then the way well-being is defined and the way it is protected from co-option will be fundamental 
to the kind of justice which a capabilities EJ ends up delivering. 
 
 
                                                
i In the hedonic psychological literature, happiness is defined in terms of the absence of negative affect. This is 
rather different from the way affect is understood in the substantial body of geographical scholarship on 
‘affective’ or emotional geographies which uses the same term and generally understands affect as “a quality of 
life that is beyond cognition and always interpersonal. It is, moreover, inexpressible: unable to be brought into 
representation” (Pile, 2010: 8; see also Thein, 2005). Some boundary crossing work between geographical and 
psychological understandings of ‘affect’ would certainly be productive. For example examining the extent to 
which (geographical) affect and types of well-being are similar is an area ripe for further investigation. However, 
that is not the focus of this paper, and because of the potential for misunderstandings, we have avoided using the 
term affect in this paper. 
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